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Abstract
The optimal support of health-related research and development with public money is a complex
challenge. Over the last century, policy makers in England have conceived and implemented a
variety of models, ranging from independent, curiosity driven research to needs-based state
commissions, and promoting different bodies to oversee scientific work. This paper traces these
approaches, identifies the principles that drove them, and discusses their role in shaping policy for
publicly funded health research, up to the recent launch of a new research strategy by the
Department of Health.
Introduction
Ever since the emergence of the UK's first public funds for
biomedical research in the early 20th century, policy mak-
ers have sought ways of optimising returns on this invest-
ment in the near and long term. It is a pertinent challenge,
as the price of poor decisions is paid in the currency of
human suffering. Science support is always vulnerable to
practical pitfalls, such as budget cuts and capacity short-
ages. At the same time, however, policy makers face ques-
tions of principle, such as the appropriate balance
between curiosity-driven and needs-driven research, and
the appropriate degree of direction by the state. Further
choices are to be made with regard to priorities, and the
individuals best placed to set them.
In England, the debate of these issues stretches back to the
first emergence of public funds for health research. This
essay traces the research strategies through which the
Department of Health, and its partners, have endeavoured
to enhance national well-being. The rationale for the
paper was to put into context the development and for-
mulation of a research and development strategy for the
Department. On this basis, the paper is also an interesting
example of using historical accounts to understand past
policy change, with the aim of informing current and
future policy making. The paper discusses the responses of
different generations of policy makers to the perennial
questions of public support of biomedical research, from
the beginning of the 20th century to the most recent
reform plans.
The beginnings (1911 to 1946)
The first public fund for health-related research for the
benefit of the British population was established through
the National Insurance Act 1911. Recognising the need for
systematic support, the government pledged that for every
individual insured, one penny of public funds would be
set aside in the newly created Medical Research Fund. The
sum generated in this way was considerable, amounting
to an estimated £40,000 to £60,000 per year [1,2].
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In 1913, a Medical Research Committee was appointed to
oversee the research activities supported by the new fund,
the scope of which was simply defined as 'medical
research' [3]. The committee comprised representatives
from the House of Lords and House of Commons, as well
as six scientific members, 'men of eminence in the most
important departments with which the Committee is con-
cerned, namely, pathology, bacteriology, medicine, sur-
gery, bio-chemistry and public health' [2].
In the early years of the Committee, no Ministry of Health
existed. Responsibility for health services was divided
between various government bodies, such as the Educa-
tion Board and the Home Office. 'Researches into medical
questions', on the other hand, were spread across the
Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of Munitions, Local Gov-
ernment Board, and Board of Control [2]. This frag-
mented situation is likely to have enhanced the freedom
of the Medical Research Committee's researchers, whose
programme of work was approved by the commission
administering the National Health Insurance. The Com-
mittee were keenly aware that this freedom was a privi-
lege, and that state support often came at the price of state
control. In 1915, its members praised their supervising
body for having allowed them 'the most complete free-
dom... to bring flexible and rapid assistance to the
national need on occasion of emergency with the least
possible delay in the motion of the constitutional
machinery' [2,4].
At the end of the First World War, the government made
plans to create a Ministry of Health, a new central body
with scope for unprecedented co-ordination of health-
related concerns. Given that health research could be seen
to fall into this remit, the future relationship of the Medi-
cal Research Committee and the new Ministry needed to
be clarified. Influential writings by Lord Haldane, the
former Lord Chancellor, and by Christopher Addison,
chairman of the Reconstruction Committee discussing the
proposals for the new Ministry, defended the principle of
independent and undirected research.
Lord Haldane's 'Report of the Machinery of Government
Committee', published in 1918, conceived the Ministry
and the Medical Research Committee as two separate, but
communicating, bodies concerned with different kinds of
research. The Committee was to continue independent,
opportunity-led research with potential relevance to vari-
ous government departments ('general use research') [2].
Government departments, on the other hand, were
encouraged to undertake research to inform administra-
tive decisions ('operational research', such as surveys),
rather than influence or rival the scientific activities of the
independent body [2]. To justify this division, Haldane
pointed out that by tradition, the work of the Committee
had 'never been confined to the investigation of questions
suggested by the current administration of the Health
Insurance Acts'.
Addison re-iterated Haldane's arguments for independent
research in a memorandum published in 1919. To dem-
onstrate the success of the 'general use' approach, he
pointed out that research into oxygen had resulted in
advances in aviation, mine rescue, and pneumonia treat-
ment. As such, the work had been of relevance to several
different government departments [5]. Convinced that
only scientific freedom could produce the highest quality
work, Addison worried that departmental direction would
force scientists to concentrate too much on immediate
needs. Going further, he warned that ministerial control
would also jeopardise the rigour scientific research, as 'a
keen and energetic minister... would constantly be
tempted to endeavour in various ways to secure that the
conclusions reached by organised work under any scien-
tific body... should not suggest that his administrative pol-
icy might require alteration' [6].
Addison's plea to keep the Committee scientists aloof
from current demands created a research vacuum for the
new Ministry to fill. Whilst Haldane's vision of Ministry
research had been largely limited to surveys and statistics,
Addison envisaged a degree of parity:
The question is how much medical research can best be
carried out by a medical staff in close relation to the admin-
istrative side of the Ministry, and how much can best be
carried out by a body whose work will be less immediately
directed towards the current administration of health mat-
ters.
The memorandum concluded that due to its natural bias
towards pressing problems, Ministry research should
respond to immediate needs, whereas Committee work
should remain research-driven [6]. It thus guarded the
freedom of Committee researchers, but at the same time
launched the Ministry as a biomedical research body in its
own right. Sir Walter Morley Fletcher, secretary of the
MRC, promoted a rather different scenario: not only must
the organisation be shielded from external control, but it
should act as national body directing all medical research,
including work funded through private donations [7].
The following official arrangements largely reflected Add-
ison's proposals. The new Ministry was created, and the
Medical Research Committee remained as a separate and
independent body, now called the Medical Research
Council (MRC). However, relations between the two bod-
ies grew increasingly tense, especially when a Departmen-
tal Cancer Committee was set up by the Ministry in 1923
[7]. To resolve the situation, in the following year, Sir Wal-Health Research Policy and Systems 2008, 6:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/6/1/2
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ter Fletcher and Sir George Newman, the Ministry's Chief
Medical Officer, privately drew up a concordat which con-
firmed each body's profile [7,8]. The young Ministry was
to 'provide investigation... of scientific problems arising in
the current administrative work of the Ministry', and
undertake 'research by such investigations as can best be
carried out by the Ministry, in the interests of public
health administration, applied knowledge or medical
services'[9].
Although its remit was now clearly mapped out, govern-
ment-led research was slow to gain momentum due to
inadequate external structures and internal capacity. For
example, in 1932, the Ministry created a Committee on
Immunisation with a strong research component, but
subsequent inertia left local authorities in charge if immu-
nisations [10]. In theory, the Ministry was uniquely
placed to combine health research with health care. In
practice, health care provision was regionally and socially
fragmented, making it difficult for the Ministry to
embrace its new identity as leader in applied research.
This situation changed fundamentally in 1946, when the
National Health Service (NHS) was created. In a radical
departure, the NHS offered a unified system for healthcare
provision across the nation, open to everyone and free at
the point of delivery. The Act explicitly put the Minister of
Health in charge of 'research into matters relating to the
causation, prevention, diagnosis of illness or mental
defectiveness', a broad remit reminiscent of the original
brief of the Medical Research Committee [11,12]. How-
ever, vision was not matched by means, and although
clinical research began to expand in teaching hospitals,
the Ministry's actual research programme remained con-
fined to public health [13]. Consequently, existing struc-
tures prevailed until the 1960s, when external pressures
re-fuelled interest in the Ministry as a significant player in
the research arena.
Struggle over territory (1964 to 1971)
The period following the National Health Service Act was
characterised by a growing awareness of science as a
national priority, as well as changes in the way that sci-
ence was undertaken [1]. This development upset the
carefully negotiated balance of responsibilities between
the MRC and the Ministry. Large-scale medical advances,
such as population screening and organ transplantation,
required structures beyond those which the MRC could
offer. The Ministry stepped in to fill the gap by developing
its own research capacity and research units. At the same
time, the MRC engaged in public health work alongside
the Ministry. The line between the research territories of
Ministry and Council thus could no longer be drawn
along the traditional idea of 'immediate' or 'applied' and
'general' work. Overlapping concerns and resulting
attempts by the Ministry to influence the MRC agenda
resulted in frictions, for example, when the Chief Medical
Officer observed a lack of epidemiological focus in the
Council's clinical work. Matters were not helped by the
fact that some in the community still regarded ministry
researchers as 'second-class scientific citizens' [14]. Wider
society, meanwhile, began to exhibit signs of disenchant-
ment with science, in some parts amounting to a veritable
science counter culture [15].
By the 1960s, the blurred relationship between the MRC
and the Ministry (from 1966, the Department of Health
and Social Security, DHSS) reflected a wider debate in
government about the best way to undertake publicly
funded research. In 1964, a government-commissioned
inquiry into civil science led by Sir Burke Trend found that
endeavours had been weakened by a lack of clarity in 'the
arrangements for co-ordinating Government's scientific
effort and for apportioning the available resources
between agencies on a rational basis' [16].
The need for a more organised approach gave rise to the
idea that government departments should set the agenda
for all publicly funded research in their field. In the case
of health research, this challenge to the MRC had not been
seriously considered since Haldane and Addison had
defended its independence in 1918/19. In 1970, the idea
of bringing research councils under departmental control
was spelled out in an unpublished report on the Agricul-
tural Research Council led by Paul Osmond of the Civil
Service Department [8,14]. Shortly afterwards, a new gov-
ernment under Edward Heath was elected, but the drive
towards reform in the management of civil science contin-
ued. To inform their own future strategy, the new govern-
ment commissioned two reports, which were published
as appendices to a Green Paper in 1971.
The first report, written by Lord Rothschild, head of the
Central Policy Review Staff, examined the department and
council system with the aim of determining 'the most
effective arrangements for organising and supporting pure
and applied scientific research and post-graduate train-
ing'. Rothschild believed that the individualistic stance
exemplified by the MRC was to blame for the perceived
unsatisfactory return on public investment in research.
Effective service for the government, he argued, required a
centralised and needs-focused approach. Administrative
departments, he observed, did not require 'scientific sup-
port' but 'applied R&D, to achieve specific predetermined
objectives' [17]. Rothschild's solution was a radically new
approach based on precise departmental commissions:
'Applied R&D... must be done on a customer contractor
basis. The customer says what he wants; the contractor
does it (if he can); and the customer pays' [17].Health Research Policy and Systems 2008, 6:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/6/1/2
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The report envisaged the government departments as the
customer, or acting on behalf of the ultimate customers,
and the research bodies as the contractor. To empower the
customer, the report proposed that a large part of the
funds previously allocated to the research councils should
be transferred to the departments. The Research Councils
would then have to win back this money by bidding for
departmental research contracts. At the same time, they
would not normally be able to refuse commissions by the
departments. Curiosity-driven research, the traditional
domain of the councils, was to be financed by a 'general
research surcharge' factored into the price of commis-
sioned work. This system, Rothschild expected, would end
the lingering 'scientific snobbery' dividing 'the 'haves' in
the Research Councils and the 'have nots' in the Depart-
ments'. After all, government department dissatisfied with
council work would 'go elsewhere, with their money, to
get their objectives met' [17].
Rothschild negated Haldane's and Addison's endorse-
ment of research council independence. He equally
rejected that departments and councils should occupy dif-
ferent positions on the basic-applied research spectrum
[1,17]. A third radical postulate called for the national
research agenda to be taken out of the hands of scientists,
for 'however distinguished, intelligent and practical scien-
tists may be, they cannot be so well qualified to decide
what the needs of the nation are, and their priorities, as
those responsible for ensuring that those needs are met'
[17]. However, Rothschild did not propose a department-
led national strategy for health-related research and devel-
opment. Priority setting, for him, was a question of iden-
tifying immediate needs. Accordingly, he felt no need to
track national R&D activities, arguing that such 'general
oversight would serve no useful purpose' [17].
The second report published with the Green Paper, 'The
Future of the Research Council System', scrutinised
Osmond's proposal to bring the research councils under
ministerial control. Led by the distinguished academic Sir
Frederick Dainton, it concluded in favour of the councils'
autonomous status. Echoing Addison's thoughts on the
relationship between government and science, Dainton
highlighted that independent research remained of great
value in public decision making: 'Departments... need to
be able to obtain help and independent advice... It is
essential that the advice and information from this source
should be free from considerations of administrative and
political convenience' [18].
Unlike Haldane and Addison, Dainton thus no longer cel-
ebrated council independence as good in itself with long-
term benefits for the nation. Instead, the report stressed
the utility of unbiased expertise for the functioning of the
departments. In this way, both Green Paper reports con-
ceptually moved the departments centre stage.
The Research Councils emerged bowed, but not broken
from the first major challenge to their status. A White
Paper published in July 1972 ensured their survival, but
implemented most of Rothschild's proposals with the
addition of the supervisory Board of Research Councils
recommended by Dainton. In the area of health, this shift
catapulted the Department of Health and Social Security
(DHSS) into a national management and leadership posi-
tion. As the paper stated, 'final responsibility for defining
the objectives of commissioned work must rest with the
Department concerned' [19].
However, the Department's research management experi-
ence was still limited. As the White Paper itself had
observed, the Select Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy had found not long before that 'at present, neither
Parliament nor the public is given sufficient information
about departmental research and development pro-
grammes'. The Department's research and development
budget for 1972–73 amounted to £13 million, including
£9.3 million for current expenditure. Of the latter sum,
only £0.7 million were earmarked for intramural work
[19].
The government appointed a Chief Scientist to oversee the
Department's expanded research and development pro-
gramme. The Chief Scientist was supported by a small
body of staff and several advisory bodies. Most notably,
the Chief Scientist's Research Committee discussed suita-
ble foundations for commissioning, such as cost-benefit-
analysis and the analysis of future needs [8,19,20]. At the
same time, £5 million out of the £20 million of public
funds for the MRC were transferred to the Department.
The sum represented the estimated 25% of MRC funding
previously spent on 'applied' research [14,19]. In addi-
tion, the Department was now represented on the Board
of the MRC as proposed by Rothschild.
The reforms allowed for stronger central direction, but
were predictably unpopular with the science community.
In particular, researchers protested that the government
had not properly analysed the supposed weaknesses of the
previous system [1]. As the reforms were implemented,
practical problems emerged. For example, the research
councils found it difficult to raise funds for non-commis-
sioned, capacity-building research, because government
departments were under no obligation to pay the new
'general research surcharge' [21]. Moreover, researchers
were disappointed that science had not gained more influ-
ence on policy making [1].Health Research Policy and Systems 2008, 6:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/6/1/2
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The subsequent relationship between the DHSS and MRC
revealed that departmental structures were insufficiently
robust to allow authoritative decision-making within the
new system. The DHSS not only needed to handle a
greatly expanded budget, but was also expected to allocate
funding across all areas of health research. Given the lim-
ited capacity of the Chief Scientist's office, this proved an
overwhelming challenge. The problem was resolved by
giving the MRC broad research contracts, which effectively
allowed the Council to continue its existing research pro-
gramme. This move was pragmatic, but ignored Roth-
schild's outspoken opposition to broad or open-ended
funding agreements. MRC researchers, meanwhile, con-
tinued to feel the reforms as a heavy administrative bur-
den, compounded by time consuming obligations to act
as expert advisers to the government [14,15].
The first radical re-structuring of the system for public
health had put customer and customer need at the centre
of funding decisions. However, reality fell short of vision
because neither customers nor needs were adequately rep-
resented by the DHSS. Nevertheless, the Department had
been promoted to a leading strategic role, and from
henceforth was a research and development player to be
reckoned with.
Reform and re-definition (1975 to 1981)
The disparity between the government's aspirations for
the new system and its practical shortcomings did not go
unnoticed, leading to a series of reports and subsequent
reforms. In 1975, a report by Maurice Kogan on the
Department's research activity highlighted how arrange-
ments differed from what had been envisaged by Roth-
schild. The Chief Scientist's organisation was on the
margins rather than at the centre of the organisation.
Worse, a severe lack of scientific experience among staff
hampered the Department in devising its own projects:
From the medical science viewpoint it was thought that the
Department was lacking staff who had sufficient research
experience, who were neither researchers nor practitioners,
but administrators and overall the Department was not suf-
ficiently strong scientifically to generate its own
projects[14,22].
In response to the report, the internal structures were re-
modelled. The result was a Chief Scientist's Research
Committee informed by more than ten Research Liaison
Groups (RLGs), which brought together departmental
advisers, independent experts, and DHSS staff [8]. Greeted
by some as the most successful attempt at establishing the
customer/contractor principle, the new construct was
soon criticised for its lay members and an overambitious
range of subjects to be covered by each group [14].
Around the time of the formation of the RLGs, in 1978, a
report by a working party of the Nuffield Provincial Hos-
pital Trust criticised the Department for lacking 'a defina-
ble research policy', and sufficient overview of the
fragmented, customer-focused R&D activities nominally
under its control [13,14]. In the following year, a review
of civil service management in the DHSS also diagnosed
shortcomings in arrangements for research and develop-
ment [8].
The government's own review of the Rothschild reforms
in 1979 made an altogether more positive assessment.
However, it acknowledged that the continuation of the
MRC programme under broad pro forma commissions
contravened the customer-contractor principle [1]. The
review traced this problem to strict constraints on admin-
istrative and staff costs, due to which the Department had
'not felt justified in developing expertise for a full com-
missioning role in the biomedical area' [23]. In response,
departmental funds for health and social security research
were put under the direct control of the Chief Scientist. At
the same time, a new concordat provided that the MRC
would officially regain its funds, but liaise closely with the
Department in shaping its research programme.
The outcome of the reforms, reports and debates of the
1970s was a hybrid of pre- and post Rothschild models.
The bid to create a single, needs-focused decision making
body had been unsuccessful, leaving the Department and
the MRC to co-exist as largely separate research bodies.
This raised once more the question of the appropriate bal-
ance between independent and commissioned, curiosity-
led and needs-based research and development. Other
issues, such as the adequate range of science to support,
and an effective linking up of science and policy, also
remained to be solved in the inevitable next round of
improvement efforts [20].
The rise of NHS Research and Development 
(1988 to 1993)
As the new decade dawned, a feeling of crisis in national
science intensified the ongoing debate about the direction
and support of research by the state [24]. The previous
years' exponential growth in the government's civil sci-
ence came to a halt, leading to cuts in departmental pro-
grammes [25]. At the same time, a fall in the UK's share of
publications and citations suggested declining scientific
standards [26,27]. As the government now considered
applied or 'near market' research as the responsibility of
industry rather than government departments, there was
also concern that national needs had grown to play a sub-
ordinate role in the public research agenda [25]. In the
health sector, these developments had translated into
worsening conditions for the conduct and disseminationHealth Research Policy and Systems 2008, 6:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/6/1/2
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of clinical research, which, in turn, affected the quality of
patient care [27].
The need to contain health care costs fuelled the demand
for change in the management of medical research. In
1988, the report 'Priorities in Medical Research' by the
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee
reviewed the organisation of medical research in the UK
and within the DHSS [24,27]. By this time, health-related
research was taking place under the auspices of three prin-
cipal bodies: the MRC, the Department of Health, and the
NHS. The MRC carried out both basic and clinical science,
but in line with the new concordat had also started to sup-
port some health services research. The Centrally Com-
missioned Programme of the Department of Health
focused on health services research and public health
research, with the aim of providing evidence for govern-
ment policy making. Finally, the NHS had also begun to
sponsor a modest amount of research across the disci-
plines. There had been attempts to co-ordinate all of these
activities and to link them with those of the medical
research charities, but no thorough success had been
achieved [27].
The Committee report approached the problem by re-vis-
iting the fundamentals of public science support. It dis-
cussed in unprecedented detail the potential and limits of
targeted research, presented stakeholder opinions on the
optimal balance of basic and applied research, and cited
various mechanisms for priority setting, for example,
research spending proportional to overall spending in a
particular area or discipline, or proportional to the
number of people affected. The Committee did not take a
clear position on priorities but proposed that overall,
research should be led by science rather than problems:
Better results will be achieved by supporting good ideas and
advances in science as they arise, than by concentrating on
recognised problems regardless of whether promising leads
are in prospect... the main focus of public policy in medical
research should be the establishment of a strong infrastruc-
ture for research in well-found laboratories and the supply
of a strongly motivated and trained research community.
Scientists' influence in shaping their own research activi-
ties thus was rehabilitated. To reinforce the point, the
committee also concluded that 'the Chief Scientist's Office
in the DHSS may be adequate for the Department's inter-
nal purposes but it has certainly not proved capable of
supplying the informed customer for health care envis-
aged by Lord Rothschild' [24].
However, these observations did not mean that all faith in
a centrally run applied research programme was lost.
Instead, the Committee promoted the NHS to fill the role
by operating its own, distinct and formally recognised
R&D programme. After decades of rivalry between Depart-
ment and the MRC, a new contender had quietly emerged.
The Committee envisaged that in the new medical trias,
the Department would return to a more limited research
role, reminiscent of the responsibilities once conceived by
Haldane:
The DHSS and the NHS both require research programmes
but these will be different in scale and kind. There is a clear
distinction between the needs of ministerial policy and
NHS research[24].
The proposals were generally well received, and led to the
creation, in 1991, of a NHS R&D programme with a single
management structure and an integrated system of deci-
sion-making, research, delivery, and management based
on a regional substructure. The Director of the new pro-
gramme had responsibility for both NHS R&D and for the
Department's Centrally Commissioned Programme
[12,27].
In his strategy for the new R&D programme, Sir Michael
Peckham, the newly appointed Director, stressed the aims
of coherence and effective translation of activities within
the wider programme of the Department, by now called
the Department of Health (DH). Priorities were to be set
by the Director with advice from a Central R&D Commit-
tee (CRDC) informed by stakeholders including patient
groups and other research funders. Areas of research of
national relevance would be funded from a central
budget, other relevant research would become the respon-
sibility of the NHS regions. The strategy paper also
defined the principal criteria for priority setting, including
the burden of disease, prevalence, policy priorities, feasi-
bility of research and potential benefits [13,28].
The first national commissioned research programme
(1992–95) promoted data collection as the basis of future
priority setting. Accordingly, its first project was a national
stock-taking exercise, the 'Health Service Survey for 1991'.
A following strategy paper furthermore proposed a sys-
tematic use of evaluations [29,30]. The same paper also
observed a predominance of science-push in the research
agenda, with 'insufficient attention being paid to a wide
range of issues germane to health sector demands'[27].
The medical community expressed their own sense of
imbalance. In particular, there was concern that despite its
outward dedication to applied research, the new system
lacked adequate incentives for clinical research [29].
In just half a decade, very significant changes had been put
into train, and the NHS had been successfully promoted
as the new arena of publicly funded, applied research. The
move integrated departmental direction and frontlineHealth Research Policy and Systems 2008, 6:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/6/1/2
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service delivery and opened up great potential for clinical
investigation, although subsequently there was some crit-
icism of evidence being selected to bolster ministers' per-
ceptions [12].
To allow the NHS to achieve the desired gravitas as 'the'
body for applied research, more than strategy was
required. Ultimately, its success would depend on ade-
quate structures linking departmental priorities with
researcher activity, demand with capacity, and capacity
with funding. All of these challenges were yet to be
resolved.
Reform of funding for NHS R&D (1994 to 1999)
Plans for clinical research under the auspices of the R&D
directorate were visionary, but at the front line, conditions
were discouraging. The NHS and Community Care Act
(1990) had introduced an internal market system in
which general practice fund holders and health authori-
ties bought services from hospital trusts. In the resulting
climate of cost awareness and competition, it had become
relatively unattractive for Trusts to host research. By 1994,
a report by the UK Coordinating Committee on Cancer
Research described how market pressures had led health
authorities and hospitals to cut costs and shorten inpa-
tient times, leading to disruptions in research [31,32]. Sci-
entific endeavour within the NHS, whilst having unique
opportunities, thus was also highly vulnerable to the
effects of internal management decisions.
To improve conditions, the Director R&D asked a task
force led by the economist Professor Anthony Culyer to
review existing arrangements for R&D in the NHS [33].
On the strategy level, the resulting report, 'Supporting
Research in the NHS' (1994), concluded that greater
coherence in activities had been achieved, but linkage
with other research funders still left to be desired. Regard-
ing the relationship of NHS and MRC, the report criticised
the seemingly unlimited claim of the MRC on NHS service
support in carrying out its own research, and called for a
new concordat.
Just as Culyer and his team continued the tradition of
reflecting on the appropriate relationship of the different
national research bodies, they, too, needed to arbitrate
between problems of immediate relevance, and longer-
term endeavours. The task force took no defined position
on this matter, but stated that the majority of its inform-
ants had opted for a combination, 'with more emphasis
on research into the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
health service provision'. With regard to priority setting,
the report called for the consultation of more stakehold-
ers, including purchasers and providers. It also advocated
an enhanced regional dimension in determining needs
and commissioning research.
Turning to the problem of costs, the task force proposed
the creation of a single funding stream, to be partly
financed by a levy on the budgets of all health care pur-
chasers. In a departure from previous, mostly informal
funding arrangements, it was proposed that in future,
institutions would distinguish between the costs of
healthcare, R&D and training, and receive dedicated
research grants and budgets [27,33].
Cuyler's levy system was accepted by the government, and
won the backing of most members of the scientific com-
munity, although there were some concerns about an
absolute reign of a single funding stream and a fixed set of
criteria. As an editorial in the BMJ observed, 'the pluralism
of sources of research funds is much appreciated by and of
benefit to research workers, who doubt that and single
committee has a monopoly on wisdom' [32].
In accordance with Culyer's proposals, from 1996, the
existing diverse funding streams were merged, and NHS
Trusts declared net R&D costs of approximately £334 mil-
lion [13]. R&D funds were then divided into two budgets.
The first budget, Support Funding, was to meet infrastruc-
ture costs and fund 'own account' work. The second
budget covered investigations in national priority areas,
which were not funded by other non-commercial bodies
[34]. In addition, a smaller, separate funding stream was
made available for policy research within the Department
of Health. Resources from the new fund were allocated on
the basis of the previously declared costs and competitive
bids [35].
The new levy was implemented amongst criticisms regard-
ing mechanisms for its collection and distribution [13]. In
1998, the Department decided to divert £10 million of the
intended levy into primary care, demonstrating that co-
habitation with service delivery could be a hazard as much
as a blessing for research [36]. Capacity for strategic plan-
ning within the Department, which had already been a
major hurdle in operating the Rothschild system, was a
further issue. An internal review of the levy in 1999 con-
cluded that the allocation of funds needed to be based on
better data collection systems, involvement of customers,
and peer review of research programmes [37]. However,
the review also acknowledged a clearer vision of NHS
research as a consistent, evidence-based whole with a
defined role in a wider scientific context.
The Culyer reforms were a major step towards putting the
NHS R&D vision on a firm organisational and financial
footing, against the odds of a fragmented frontline and
research-averse internal market. However, the odds were
resilient. In particular, it proved difficult to achieve the
desired transparency of research costs and activities within
organisations unaccustomed to such central scrutiny.Health Research Policy and Systems 2008, 6:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/6/1/2
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Consultants commissioned to take stock of current activi-
ties in externally funded R&D found it difficult to find
'sufficient data ... in providers to be able to undertake a
robust data collection and analysis exercise' [13,38]. Not
only was change needed far beyond the R&D directorate's
immediate sphere of influence. To anchor the new
arrangements, the fundamental questions of research sup-
port needed to be addressed afresh: how to link up with
other research support; how to set priorities; and how to
ensure the equitable distribution of funds.
A vision of needs driven excellence (2000 to 
2006)
The Department of Health set about strengthening the
basis of its new approach in a series of strategy papers
published in 2000 and 2001 [39-41]. To achieve clear and
central positioning of its investigations in the wider non-
commercial research landscape, the Department pro-
moted partnerships, the sharing of findings and interdis-
ciplinary work through the creation of a new funders'
group. Moreover, synergies with industry and the univer-
sities featured as an objective in the departmental Science
Strategy.
Naturally, in the context of relationships with other
research bodies, the old question of the appropriate roles
of the Department, the NHS, and the MRC also needed to
be answered. Here, the strategy opted for differentiation
according to clinical immediacy rather than degree of
direction, specifying that the MRC, along with the other
Research Councils, was best placed to cater for 'research
needs that are likely to require more basic input'. The NHS
would cater for its needs through its national pro-
grammes, whereas the DH would commission its own
research from external bodies as required. However, the
legacy of blurred boundaries was difficult to overcome,
and the MRC was also conceded work in areas where it
commanded specific expertise [41].
If the focus on needs was to be the distinguishing feature
of research in the NHS, determining these needs was of
primary importance. The Department proposed to resolve
this issue through the use of expert advice, stakeholder
consultations, horizon scanning and systematic reviews,
but did not specify how the information obtained would
be weighted. Similarly, it proposed to improve priority
setting through robust criteria, but did not detail how
these criteria would be developed. Like the previous
review committees, the authors found it easier to formu-
late general guiding principles than to give them content.
The developments of the preceding decades had made the
task no easier. Where Haldane could propagate the intui-
tion of researchers, and Rothschild the circumscribed
'order' of the customer, the sheer range of individuals,
organisations and methods now considered to have a
rightful share in departmental decision-making had
grown substantially. As a result, providing leadership had
become a delicate balancing act, which did not lend itself
to ex ante decisions of principle.
Finally, to clarify the allocation of funding, the Depart-
ment introduced a remodelled system which differenti-
ated between a funding stream to cover the costs of
supporting R&D, and funding for work in NHS 'priorities
and needs' areas [39,42]. However, the intended improve-
ments were slow to make themselves felt at the front line.
In the following period, funding levels were subject to
strong fluctuations due to increases and cuts, including a
further diversion of R&D funds to meet frontline delivery
targets. In February 2001, the government pledged to
increase the budget for NHS research and development by
£30 million, bringing the total £479 m. The additional
funds were earmarked for research commissioned by the
Department of Health £21 million) and to boost support
for NHS health care providers undertaking research (£9
million). However, in September of the same year, funds
for R&D were once more re-directed, as funds for regional
NHS R&D were used to meet frontline service targets
[43,44].
More fundamentally, health researchers questioned the
mechanism of distribution. A report by the Academy of
Medical Sciences, published in 2003, argued that clinical
research was receiving little of the funds 'notionally'
attributed to NHS R&D. To amend the situation, the
report called for funding from the MRC and the govern-
ment's Office of Science and Technology to be made avail-
able for the support of clinical trials and training, and to
create incentives for medical academic careers [45]. Once
again, a feeling of crisis manifested itself through a foray
into the territory of other public fund holders.
The Academy of Medical Sciences was not alone in ques-
tioning the functionality of the funding mechanisms. In
the autumn of 2003, the Department appointed a project
team to throw light on the question whether R&D funds
had been used for other health service activities, as sug-
gested by substantial local variations in the cost of serv-
ices. In 2004, to counter the risk of cross-subsidies
between service delivery and research, Sally Davies, Direc-
tor of R&D, then called for institutions to lay open the
exact use of their budgets, a basic element of Culyer's orig-
inal concept for the levy. In the same year, the Treasury's
Science and Innovation Investment Framework (2004)
pledged to move to full transparency of the use of R&D
funds allocated to NHS Trusts [46].
Recent government pledges to strengthen the fabric of the
Department's strategy have also focused on funding and
funding partners. In 2004, the Treasury committed toHealth Research Policy and Systems 2008, 6:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/6/1/2
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increase NHS R&D funding by £100 million by 2008. The
budget also announced the creation of a new body, the
UK Clinical Research Collaboration, to bring together all
major stakeholders with the aim of promoting the attrac-
tiveness and competitiveness of the United Kingdom as a
location for clinical research. Unlike previous bodies, this
group also invited representatives from industry.
In January 2006 the history of public strategy for health
research reached a new milestone in the publication of the
Department of Health's new national health research
strategy, 'Best Research for Best Health' [47]. The strategy
represents a fresh endeavour to meet the challenges
which, as we have seen, have presented themselves at
every turn of the previous decades' policy development,
such as investment of resources and commissioning of
research.
Driven by the overall objective of harnessing research to
improve the 'health and wealth' of the nation by 2010 and
beyond, 'Best Research for Best Health' marks a number of
significant structural changes and departures from previ-
ous practice. These include the creation of a National
Institute for Health Research (NIHR) as a virtual national
research facility offering attractive and effective working
conditions for world class staff. From a historical perspec-
tive, the creation of this outspokenly competitive new
body represents the Department's boldest step yet to exor-
cise the one time stigma of its researchers as 'second-class
scientific citizens'. The document also introduced a new
distribution model for R&D resources to replace previous
trust allocations. In a bid to reconcile breath and depth of
funding, the new model takes a triple approach of popu-
lation-based as well as broadly and leading edge focused
competitive funding.
The strategy envisions the NIHR to provide a consolidated
focus for the Department's programmes of research com-
missioning. In the tradition of its predecessors, the docu-
ment does not expand on how priorities for funding are to
be determined beyond stating the aim to support 'impor-
tant research which is inadequately supported by other
funders', and maintaining a firm focus on identified
needs. However, it highlights two key partners in estab-
lishing research programmes. The first is patients, who,
from a complete absence in earlier strategies, have
acceded to an (at least intentional) integral role in the
'identification, design, recruitment and dissemination of
projects'. The second is the UK Clinical Research Collabo-
ration, the forum for clinical research which comprises the
MRC amongst other stakeholders. Ultimately, how fund-
ing decisions are made and implemented, and in what
ways partners are involved in this process will be one of
the most interesting elements of the new strategy as it is
put into practice.
Conclusion
The conditions and methods of health-related research
have changed beyond recognition since the conception of
the National Insurance Fund in Edwardian days. By con-
trast, the basic questions and tensions regarding the opti-
mal support of such research have proved remarkably
timeless. They include the balance between the control
and freedom of researchers; between competing scientific
fields; between the influence of scientists, policy makers
and patients; and between healthcare providers' role as
hosts of research and efficient players in the market.
As shown in this paper, these questions have been repeat-
edly debated over almost a century of publicly funded
biomedical and health research in England. Some
responses have been cyclical in nature, such as the degree
of autonomy granted to researchers. Other questions have
been answered with new models. For example, Haldane
initially granted the strongest voice in setting the biomed-
ical agenda to the researchers themselves, whereas Roth-
schild shifted decision making to ministry staff, and in
more recent times the power has again been redistributed
among a steadily growing group of stakeholders.
Finally, some issues have proved so delicate as to become
unattractive for outspoken policies. This is noticeable in
the areas of priority setting, and particularly regarding the
balance between research that has an immediate relevance
versus research of absolute quality and intrinsic future
potential. In the last few decades, several committee and
policy papers have circumvented this issue by neutrally
presenting different arguments; others have proposed to
put the decision to the vote of stakeholders. The Depart-
ment's latest strategy envisages close cooperation with the
UKCRC and patients, while firmly building on the
premise that research can be attractive to the best minds
and effective while driven by needs of the NHS.
However, the experience of the previous models described
in this paper highlight the intrinsic challenges of negotiat-
ing patient need and researcher freedom, and of support-
ing applied research within a healthcare setting. Notably,
they include generating consensus over what the most
pressing needs are, coping with the competing pressures
of delivery, and satisfying expectations in research per-
formance and health outcomes. Given these challenges,
no strategy, including the most recent strategy by the
Department of Health, is likely to be the last word in
health research policy. However, in the history of develop-
ing such approaches, 'Best Research for Best Health' is a
novel departure which, more than any of its predecessors,
will test the Department's potential as a leader of a world
class system of national health research.Health Research Policy and Systems 2008, 6:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/6/1/2
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